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Abstract
We study the problem of recovering the distribution of cognitive characteristics in a pop-
ulation of boundedly rational agents from their aggregate choices. In contrast to much
of the theoretical literature on bounded rationality, we make use of choices from a fixed
menu of alternatives rather than from a rich collection of menus. We examine in detail two
models of choice with limited attention, and we show that both “consideration probability”
and “consideration capacity” distributions are substantially identified by aggregate choice
shares. These two models are applied to data on over-the-counter painkiller sales, yielding
concurrent estimates that on average two or three out of the eight available products are
considered in this market. We also demonstrate how our framework can be used “counter-
factually” for welfare analysis.
Keywords: attention, bounded rationality, revealed preference, stochastic choice.
J.E.L. codes: D01, D03, D12.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Individuals differ not only in their tastes, but also in their cognitive characteristics. They have
different computational abilities, different levels of strategic and epistemic sophistication, and
different capacities for extracting relevant information from their environment. In this paper
we develop tools for studying the choices of agents who differ in the degree to which they
∗We are grateful to Jason Abaluck, Abi Adams, Reyer Gerlagh, Alessandro Iaria, Rod McCrorie, and Irina
Merkurieva for comments and suggestions, as well as to seminar audiences at CRETA, ECARES, Tilburg University,
the University of Edinburgh, the University of Vienna, the University of St Andrews, the Barcelona GSE Summer
Forum 2016, D-TEA 2016, and the Seventh Italian Congress of Econometrics and Empirical Economics. We are in-
debted to Vishal Singh for making available the dataset used in the empirical exercise in Section 4. Manzini and
Mariotti thank the ESRC for financial support provided through grant ES/J012513/1.
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 attend to the available alternatives. In the marketing literature, the subset of alternatives that
an agent actively investigates is known as the consideration set, and this will be the specific
manifestation of attention that we focus on. But we view the present exercise as merely one
example of how cognitive heterogeneity can be employed to broaden the scope of economic
models.1
Classical revealed preference analysis has studied extensively the correspondence between
unobserved tastes and observed choices. More recently, theoretical work on boundedly ratio-
nal decision making has extended this methodology to incorporate a range of cognitive factors,
including computational constraints, norms and heuristics, reference points and other fram-
ing effects, and various conceptions of attention.2 One potential drawback of such theories
is that they typically take as given a rich dataset—comprising the same individual’s choices
from many different overlapping menus—that can be used to identify the latent components
of the cognitive model of interest.3 But idealized data of this sort may not be available in prac-
tice, particularly when the category of decision problem arises rarely (e.g., choice of hospital
provider for elective surgery) or the menu is slow to change (e.g., choice of daily newspaper).
In these contexts “full identification” results furnished by the theoretical literature on bounded
rationality may be unrealistically data hungry, and alternative approaches are needed to link
theory to what is feasible empirically.
To address this problem, our theoretical approach takes as primitive a dataset consisting of a
single, fixed menu faced by a population of agents, together with the observed aggregate choice
shares of the alternatives. Cognitive heterogeneity leads individuals to choose differently from
this menu even when they have homogeneous tastes—an assumption that we impose to clarify
the theoretical analysis, but which can be relaxed.4 Given a particular cognitive model, our
research question then becomes whether the distribution of parameters in the model can be
inferred from the choice shares, in the same way that preference parameters are revealed by
individual choice data.
1Another example is supplied by Kneeland’s [18] analysis of heterogeneity in the cognitive characteristic of
higher-order rationality.
2Contributions to this literature include, among others, Apesteguia and Ballester [2], Baigent and Gaertner [3],
Caplin and Dean [6], Caplin et al. [7], Cherepanov et al. [8], de Oliveira et al. [12], Eliaz and Spiegler [13], Manzini
and Mariotti [24, 25], Masatlioglu and Nakajima [26], Masatlioglu et al. [27], Ok et al. [35], Salant and Rubin-
stein [36], and Tyson [42, 43].
3For instance, Masatlioglu et al. [27] require choice data for all possible menus, while Manzini and Mariotti [25]
impose a weaker but still stringent “richness” assumption. Note that even stronger background assumptions about
data availability are commonplace in the theory of choice under uncertainty, where the decision maker is typically
asked to report preferences over a highly structured mathematical space designed to facilitate identification.
4Taste heterogeneity is discussed in Section 3.4.2 and allowed for in the empirical exercise in Section 4. Note that
for this generalization to be feasible, it will be essential that the cognitive and taste heterogeneity be statistically
independent.
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 1.2 Two models of consideration set formation
In our general framework, each agent has a cognitive type parameter θ ∈ Θ that is distributed
in the population according to F. Assuming that tastes are homogeneous and known, an indi-
vidual of type θ chooses alternative x with probability pθ (x), and the corresponding aggregate
choice share is
p (x) =
∫
Θ
pθ (x) dF. (1)
To the extent that the cognitive model captures some form of bounded rationality, neither the
individual probabilities nor the population shares will put all weight on the best available op-
tion (according to the common preferences of the agents). Indeed, the fact that suboptimal
alternatives are sometimes chosen is what will allow us to infer the unobserved cognitive dis-
tribution F from the observed aggregate shares.5
More specifically, our interest in this paper is in bounded rationality as limited attention,
and here the parameter θ will affect the formation of the consideration set.6 We will study
in detail two different models of how this occurs, referred to below as the ρ-model and the γ-
model. The first is a variant of the consideration set structure in Manzini and Mariotti [25] and
has cognitive parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1], expressing the probability that each alternative is considered
and interpreted as the agent’s degree of general awareness of the decision making environment.
In contrast, the second model has parameter γ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, equal to the cardinality of the
consideration set and interpreted as a constraint on the number of alternatives that the agent
can actively investigate at any one time.7 Both models assume preferences are maximized over
the consideration set; both include full rationality as a special case (respectively, ρ = 1 and
γ→ ∞); and both specify a default consequence in case the consideration set is empty.
1.3 Preview of results
We show first that, for several natural parameterizations of our consideration set models, the
cognitive distribution F can be inferred from a sufficient number of observed aggregate shares.
For instance, if the consideration probability ρ is uniformly distributed on an interval, then the
bounds of this interval can be recovered from the shares of the two most preferred alternatives
(Example 3). We then proceed to show that for large menus, the entire cognitive distribution
5Note that our framework has similarities to mixed models in the discrete choice literature (see Train [41] and
McFadden [30]), where θ would be a taste parameter such as the unobserved marginal utility of some observed
characteristic. However, since we shall use pθ to express hypotheses about cognition instead of tastes, our spec-
ification calls for different functional form assumptions. In particular, pθ will not be a logit conditional on θ (see
Luce [21]), as would typically be assumed in relation to tastes.
6Although we adopt a bounded-rationality interpretation of consideration sets, it is worth noting that other
interpretations are possible. Indeed, alternatives may fail to be considered due to habit formation, search costs, or
other forms of rational inattention (see, e.g., Caplin and Dean [6] and Sims [39]).
7In the context of a price competition game, de Clippel et al. [11] use a similar model to implement consumers
with limited attention.
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 can for practical purposes be recovered even in the absence of parametric assumptions. More
precisely, in the γ-model the aggregate shares identify the probabilities of all consideration set
sizes that are less than the cardinality n of the menu (Proposition 1). Turning to the ρ-model,
the shares are seen to identify the first n raw moments of F (Proposition 2). Using maximum
entropy techniques and sparsity analysis, we find that these moments can under mild condi-
tions be used to reconstruct or closely approximate the distribution itself (Propositions 3–4). In
each case, the identification is due to the system of equations that define the aggregate shares
being recursive and linear in the relevant quantities (i.e., the probabilities or raw moments),
so that explicit formulas for these quantities can be obtained by inverting a triangular or anti-
triangular matrix.
Finally, we provide a circumscribed empirical exercise that applies our theoretical results to
data on over-the-counter painkiller sales. Allowing for both cognitive and taste heterogeneity
(the latter using a standard logit specification), we estimate suitably parameterized versions of
both models of consideration set formation using maximum likelihood. The average value of ρ
is estimated at 0.32, and the average value of γ at 2.1. The estimated models roughly agree on
the mean number of painkiller products considered—between two and three out of the eight
available—and there is no evidence to support a hypothesis that the entire menu is considered
in this setting. An advantage of the methodology is that our “deep parameter” estimates may
be used to compute consumer surplus under both the status quo and counterfactual scenarios, a
comparison that can form the basis for policy analysis. Moreover, our contribution can be seen
as complementary to existing empirical work on limited attention: For example, Crawford et
al. [10] show in a model-free context that ignoring consideration-set effects may lead to biased
estimates of preference parameters, whereas we use structural models of attention to jointly
estimate tastes and cognitive characteristics.8
1.4 Outline
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our general framework
and introduces the two specific models of consideration set formation. Section 3 derives our
theoretical results on inferring the cognitive type distribution from aggregate choice shares,
and also discusses the issues raised by indifference and taste heterogeneity. Section 4 contains
the empirical exercise, and Section 5 concludes.
8Other relevant papers include those by Sovinsky Goeree [40], Van Nierop et al. [34], Abaluck and Adams [1],
Lu [20], and Honka et al. [16]. See Section 4.5 for a brief review of the empirical literature in this area.
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 2 Two models of consideration set formation
2.1 General framework
Let X denote the universal set of alternatives. A menu is any nonempty A ⊆ X, with which
is associated a default outcome dA (not in A). When faced with the menu A, an agent either
chooses exactly one of the available alternatives or chooses none and accepts dA. For example,
we could have that:
(i) the menu contains retailers selling a particular product, and the default is not to buy the
product at all;
(ii) the menu contains banks offering fixed-term deposits, and the default is to keep the money
in cash; or
(iii) the menu contains risky lotteries, and the default is a risk-free payment.
In order to concentrate on cognitive rather than taste heterogeneity, we shall assume in
the theoretical part of the paper (i.e., Sections 2–3) that all agents share the same preferences
over the alternatives. Equivalently, this can be thought of as using the average utilities of
alternatives in the population, ignoring variation. In this sense our approach is dual to that of
the classical stochastic-choice literature in economics, where preferences are allowed to vary
but cognitive capabilities are implicitly assumed to be uniform. Observe that homogeneous
tastes are plausible in examples (i) and (ii) above, where preferences will be determined largely
by price and interest rate comparisons, as well as in example (iii) if all agents are approximately
risk neutral over the relevant stakes. In view of this assumption (relaxed in Section 3.4.2), we
denote by kA the kth best option on menu A according to the unanimous preferences, so that
the full menu appears as A = {1A, 2A, . . . , |A|A}. We emphasize (see Footnote 4) that both
cognitive and taste heterogeneity are allowed for in the empirical exercise in Section 4.
We model cognitive heterogeneity by assigning each agent a cognitive type θ ∈ Θ ⊂ <,
drawn independently across agents from the distribution F. We write pθ (kA) for the probability
that type θ chooses alternative kA from menu A, and
p (kA) =
∫
Θ
pθ (kA)dF (2)
for the overall share in the population. Similarly, we write pθ (dA) for the probability that type
θ accepts the default consequence, and
p (dA) =
∫
Θ
pθ (dA)dF (3)
for the population share. For each θ ∈ Θ we have ∑|A|k=1 pθ (kA) = 1− pθ (dA), and likewise in
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 aggregate ∑|A|k=1 p (kA) = 1− p (dA). When we wish to emphasize the role of the type distribu-
tion in determining the choice probabilities, we write p (kA; F) and p (dA; F).
The basic scenario of interest involves the members of a large population choosing from a
fixed menu M, with |M| = n. The analyst observes the aggregate choice shares, but does not
know the cognitive type distribution F. In this context we shall generally suppress dependence
on M, writing pθ (k) and pθ (d) for the type-specific frequencies and p (k) and p (d) for the pop-
ulation shares. Our goal is to deduce information about the type distribution from the shares
〈p (1) , p(2), . . . , p (n) , p(d)〉, and to use this knowledge to predict aggregate choice behavior
from menus other than M.
We proceed now to specialize this framework to two more concrete models illustrating
different ways that the agents’ attention to the alternatives may be limited. Among the alter-
natives that are considered (i.e., that attract attention), each agent will choose the best option
according to the shared preference order. But since the alternatives considered may be a strict
subset of those actually available, the attention deficits captured in the two specialized models
can lead to sub-optimal decision making.
2.2 Consideration probability: The ρ-model
Let ρ ∈ [0, 1] = Θ denote the probability that the agent considers each alternative on the
menu, with consideration independent across agents and alternatives.9 In this case alternative
k will be chosen if and only if the agent both (i) notices k and (ii) fails to notice each alternative
l < k; whereas the default consequence will arise if no alternatives at all are noticed. The
type-conditional choice frequencies are therefore
pρ (k) = ρ[1− ρ]k−1, (4)
pρ (d) = [1− ρ]n; (5)
with corresponding aggregate shares
p (k) =
∫ 1
0
ρ[1− ρ]k−1dF, (6)
p (d) =
∫ 1
0
[1− ρ]ndF. (7)
Example 1. [Uniform ρ] If the consideration probability ρ is distributed uniformly on the inter-
val [ρmin, ρmax], with 0 ≤ ρmin < ρmax ≤ 1, then the cognitive distribution is
F(ρ) =
ρ− ρmin
ρmax − ρmin . (8)
9Variants of this model have been studied by Manzini and Mariotti [25] and Brady and Rehbeck [5].
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 In this case Equations 6–7 take the form
p (k) =
∫ ρmax
ρmin
ρ[1− ρ]k−1dρ
ρmax − ρmin =
[1+ kρmin][1− ρmin]k − [1+ kρmax][1− ρmax]k
k[k + 1][ρmax − ρmin] , (9)
p(d) =
∫ ρmax
ρmin
[1− ρ]ndρ
ρmax − ρmin =
[1− ρmin]n+1 − [1− ρmax]n+1
[n + 1][ρmax − ρmin] .  (10)
2.3 Consideration capacity: The γ-model
Let γ ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} = Θ denote the number of alternatives that the agent is able to consider;
that is, the “consideration capacity.” When γ < n we assume that the agent is equally likely
to consider each Γ ⊂ M with |Γ| = γ, and when γ ≥ n we know that the entire menu M will
be considered. In the former case there are clearly (nγ) candidate consideration sets. Of these,
exactly (n−kγ−1) both contain alternative k and do not contain any superior alternative ` < k.
The probability of k being chosen is thus (n−kγ−1)/(
n
γ). Note that this probability is 0 for k >
n− γ+ 1, since here there are fewer than γ− 1 alternatives inferior to k that can populate the
consideration set in order to allow k to be chosen. Of course, whenever the entire menu is
considered we can be certain that alternative 1 will be chosen, regardless of the precise value
of γ ≥ n.
The type-conditional choice frequencies can now be expressed as
pγ(k) =
(
n−k
min{γ,n}−1)/(
n
min{γ,n}) if γ > 0,
0 if γ = 0;
(11)
pγ(d) =
0 if γ > 0,1 if γ = 0. (12)
Defining the probability masses
pi(0) = F(0), (13)
∀γ ≥ 1, pi(γ) = F(γ)− F(γ− 1); (14)
the corresponding aggregate shares are
p(1) =
∞
∑
γ=1
min {γ, n}
n
pi(γ), (15)
∀k : 2 ≤ k ≤ n, p(k) =
n−k+1
∑
γ=1
(n−kγ−1)
(nγ)
pi(γ), (16)
p(d) = pi(0). (17)
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 Example 2. [Poisson γ] Consider the Poisson specification pi(γ) = µ
γe−µ
γ! for µ ≥ 0. In this case
Equations 15–17 take the form
p(1) = e−µ
∞
∑
γ=1
min {γ, n}
n
µγ
γ!
, (18)
∀k : 2 ≤ k ≤ n, p(k) = e−µ
n−k+1
∑
γ=1
(n−kγ−1)
(nγ)
µγ
γ!
, (19)
p(d) = e−µ.  (20)
3 Inferring the cognitive type distribution
3.1 Parametric analysis
We first consider a variety of plausible functional forms for the cognitive type distribution, aim-
ing to find tractable expressions that relate cognitive parameters to aggregate choice shares. As
we shall see, under several natural parameterizations it is possible to identify the type distri-
bution uniquely from a small number of appropriately selected share observations. Apart from
increasing our familiarity with the two models under investigation, the main purpose of the ex-
amples below is to highlight the non-obvious ways that choice shares can convey information
about cognitive parameters.
Example 3. [Uniform ρ] Given the distribution in Example 1 for the consideration probability
ρ, we have the choice shares
p (1) =
[1+ ρmin][1− ρmin]− [1+ ρmax][1− ρmax]
2[ρmax − ρmin] =
ρmax + ρmin
2
, (21)
p(2) =
[1+ 2ρmin][1− ρmin]2 − [1+ 2ρmax][1− ρmax]2
6[ρmax − ρmin]
=
ρmax + ρmin
2
− ρ
2
max + ρmaxρmin + ρ
2
min
3
. (22)
Solving Equations 21–22 then yields the parameter values
ρmax = p (1) +
√
3[p(1)− p(2)− p(1)2], (23)
ρmin = p (1)−
√
3[p(1)− p(2)− p(1)2].  (24)
Example 4. [Poisson γ] Given the distribution in Example 2 for the consideration capacity γ,
we have the default share p (d) = exp[−µ] and hence µ = − log p(d). 
In each of these two examples, the full type distribution can be retrieved from as many choice
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 share observations as there are cognitive parameters. In the uniform ρ-model the identifying
shares are those of the two best alternatives, while in the Poisson γ-model it is the share of the
default outcome.
We next supply two-parameter functional forms for our two cognitive models in which
identification of the type distribution is more challenging. In the first example, to infer the
distribution of the consideration capacity we can use the shares of the two worst alternatives,
the default share, and the size of the menu.
Example 5. [Pascal γ ] Consider the Pascal (or “negative binomial”) specification with pi(γ) =
(γ+r−1γ )[1− q]rqγ, for r ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .} and q ∈ (0, 1). In this case Equations 15–17 take the form
p(1) = [1− q]r
∞
∑
γ=1
min {γ, n}
n
(
γ+ r− 1
γ
)
qγ, (25)
∀k : 2 ≤ k ≤ n, p(k) = [1− q]r
n−k+1
∑
γ=1
(n−kγ−1)
(nγ)
(
γ+ r− 1
γ
)
qγ, (26)
p(d) = [1− q]r. (27)
When n ≥ 3 we can compute the share ratios
p(n)
p(d)
=
qr
n
, (28)
p(n− 1)
p(n)
= 1+
q[r + 1]
n− 1 ; (29)
allowing us to express the parameters as
q = [n− 1]
[
p(n− 1)
p(n)
− 1
]
− np(n)
p(d)
, (30)
r =
np(n)2
p(d)[n− 1] [p(n− 1)− p(n)]− np(n)2 .  (31)
The next example involves a distribution for the consideration probability that will be used
later for the empirical exercise in Section 4. Here we can obtain closed-form expressions for the
parameters in two special cases, though not in general.
Example 6. [Kumaraswamy ρ] Consider the Kumaraswamy specification having distribution
F (ρ) = 1− [1− ρa]b, for a, b > 0.
9
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 If b = 1, then we have F (ρ) = ρa . In this case Equations 6–7 appear as
p (k) = a
∫ 1
0
ρa [1− ρ]k−1 dρ = aB (a + 1, k) , (32)
p (d) = a
∫ 1
0
ρa−1[1− ρ]ndρ = aB (a, n + 1) ; (33)
where B is the beta function.10 From p (1) = aB(a + 1, 1) = aa+1 we then obtain
a =
p (1)
1− p (1) . (34)
Alternatively, if a = 1 then we have F (ρ) = 1− [1− ρ] b . In this case the shares are
p (k) = b
∫ 1
0
ρ [1− ρ] k+b−2dρ = bB (2, k + b− 1) = b
[k + b][k + b− 1] , (35)
p (d) = b
∫ 1
0
[1− ρ] n+b−1dρ = bB(1, n + b) = b
n + b
. (36)
From p(d) = bn+b we then obtain
b =
np(d)
1− p(d) . (37)
In the general case, Equations 6–7 take the form
p (k) = ab
∫ 1
0
ρa [1− ρ] k−1 [1− ρa]b−1 dρ, (38)
p (d) = ab
∫ 1
0
ρa−1 [1− ρ] n [1− ρa]b−1 dρ. (39)
Using Equation 38, we can write the first two moments of the ρ distribution as
m1 = ab
∫ 1
0
ρa [1− ρa]b−1 dρ = p(1), (40)
m2 = ab
∫ 1
0
ρa+1 [1− ρa]b−1 dρ
= ab
∫ 1
0
[1− [1− ρ]]ρa [1− ρa]b−1 dρ
= p(1)− p(2). (41)
This suggests that the difficulty of expressing the parameters in terms of the choice shares is
primarily due to the difficulty of inverting the map 〈a, b〉 7→ 〈m1, m2〉 for this functional form,
rather than to any feature of the consideration probability model itself. 
The observation that moments mj of the Kumaraswamy distribution can be expressed as
10Recall that the beta function is defined by B(y, z) =
∫ 1
0 t
y−1[1− t]z−1dt, for y, z > 0.
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 weighted sums of the choice shares extends to values of j > 2, and is in fact a general feature
of the ρ-model. This property is exploited in the nonparametric analysis of the consideration
probability model in Sections 3.2–3.3 below.
3.2 Nonparametric analysis
3.2.1 The nonparametric inference problem
The examples in the previous section have shown a variety of ways that information about
the type distribution F can be encoded in the choice shares, depending on the cognitive model
and the specific parameterization employed. In this section, in contrast, we turn to the general
structure of the inference problem. We shall see that identification of the type distribution
remains tractable in both models even without parametric assumptions on F. This is because
the choice shares are linear in the type probabilities pi(γ) in the consideration capacity model,
and linear in the moments mj of F in the consideration probability model. Moreover, each
system of equations has a simple triangular structure that enables it to be solved recursively,
using one additional choice share at each step.
These observations about the inference problem tell us that under either of the two cognitive
models, the information encoded in the choice shares can be decoded by inverting a triangular
matrix of dimension n, the number of alternatives. The larger is the observed menu, the more
detailed will be the picture of F that is revealed by aggregate choice data. In the γ-model
increasing the size of the menu to n + 1 will yield an extra type probability pi(n), while in
the ρ-model such an increase will yield an extra moment mn. In the latter case we can then
use well-established technology (both maximum entropy methods and results from sparsity
theory) to show that knowledge of the moments of F allows us to reconstruct—or to construct
a good approximation of—the distribution itself (see Section 3.3).
3.2.2 The γ-model: Recovering n probabilities
Without functional form assumptions on F, choice shares in the consideration capacity model
are given by Equations 15–17. The first two of these equations can be written together in matrix
form as 
p (1)
...
p (k)
...
p (n)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
=

1
n · · · γn · · · n−1n 1
...
...
1
n · · ·
(n−kγ−1)
(nγ)
0 0
...
...
...
1
n 0 · · · 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

pi (1)
...
pi (γ)
...
pi (n− 1)
1− F (n− 1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
. (42)
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 The upper anti-triangular matrix C has a lower anti-triangular inverse, allowing us to write
pi = C−1p. Indeed, we can compute the probabilities of the n smallest consideration capacities
explicitly as
pi(0) = p(d) = 1−
n
∑
k=1
p (k) , (43)
∀γ : 1 ≤ γ < n, pi (γ) =
(
n
γ
) n
∑
k=n−γ+1
[−1][γ−1]−[n−k]
(
γ− 1
n− k
)
p(k). (44)
On the other hand, the probabilities pi(γ) for γ ≥ n cannot be inferred from the available data,
since these consideration capacities are behaviorally indistinguishable in a setting with only n
alternatives. We summarize our conclusions for this model as follows.
Proposition 1. In the γ-model, the probabilities 〈pi (γ)〉 n−1γ=0 are uniquely determined by the aggregate
choice shares 〈p (k)〉 nk=1.
3.2.3 The ρ-model: Recovering n moments
In the consideration probability model, the choice shares are given by Equations 6–7. We can
expand the binomial in Equation 6 to yield
p(k) =
∫ 1
0
ρ
[
k−1
∑
j=0
(
k− 1
j
)
[−ρ]j
]
dF =
k
∑
j=1
(−1) j−1
(
k− 1
j− 1
)
mj, (45)
where mj =
∫ 1
0 ρ
jdF is the jth raw moment of the type distribution. Similarly, Equation 7 can
be expressed in terms of the moments as
p (d) =
∫ 1
0
[
n
∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
[−ρ]j
]
dF = 1+
n
∑
j=1
[−1]j
(
n
j
)
mj. (46)
Equation 45 appears in matrix form as

p (1)
...
p (k)
...
p (n)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
=

1 0 · · · 0
...
...
1 · · · [−1]j−1(k−1j−1) 0
...
...
1 · · · [−1]j−1(n−1j−1) · · · [−1]n−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R

m1
...
mj
...
mn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
. (47)
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 The lower triangular matrix R is involutory (i.e., equal to its own inverse), allowing us to write
m = Rp. The n smallest moments of F are then given by
∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, mj =
j
∑
k=1
[−1]k−1
(
j− 1
k− 1
)
p (k) . (48)
We conclude the following.
Proposition 2. In the ρ-model, the moments
〈
mj
〉 n
j=1 are uniquely determined by the aggregate choice
shares 〈p (k)〉 nk=1.
3.2.4 Relationship between the two models
In the ρ-model the same consideration probability applies independently to each option, and
so all subsets of the menu of a given size are equally likely to be the consideration set. It follows
that the ρ-model is a special case of the γ-model and Equation 42 holds in this case.
In the ρ-model, the probability that the consideration set contains exactly γ alternatives is
pi(γ) =
∫ 1
0
(
n
γ
)
ργ[1− ρ]n−γdF
=
(
n
γ
) ∫ 1
0
ργ
[
n−γ
∑
i=0
(
n− γ
i
)
[−ρ]i
]
dF
=
(
n
γ
) n−γ
∑
i=0
(
n− γ
i
)
[−1]imγ+i
=
(
n
γ
) n
∑
j=γ
(
n− γ
j− γ
)
[−1]j−γmj. (49)
In matrix form, these equalities appear as

pi (1)
...
pi (γ)
...
pi (n)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
=

n · · · n(n−1j−1)[−1]j−1 · · · n[−1]n−1
...
...
0 (nγ)(
n−γ
j−γ)[−1]j−γ · · · (nγ)[−1]n−γ
...
...
0 · · · 0 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q

m1
...
mj
...
mn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
. (50)
Combining Equations 42 and 50, we then have p = Cpi = CQm. This is equivalent to the direct
calculation of the choice probabilities in Equation 47, since it can be verified that CQ = R.
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 3.3 Beyond moments in the ρ-model
3.3.1 From moments to distributions
Throughout Section 3.3 we shall treat as known a finite number of moments of the type distri-
bution F, appealing to Proposition 2 for justification. We proceed to outline two different strate-
gies for ensuring that this moment information adequately captures the distribution itself. The
first strategy relies upon discreteness of the distribution and guarantees a unique characteriza-
tion of F, while the second relies upon differentiability and guarantees convergence to F in the
limit (with respect to n).
3.3.2 Discrete distributions
Assume first that F is a discrete distribution, with ρ taking on values 〈ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρL〉. The num-
ber L of cognitive types is known, though the values themselves may be unknown. We assume,
however, that the values must be located on a finite grid of admissible points in [0, 1], which
can be as fine as desired.
The realized values of ρ have probabilities 〈pi (ρ1) ,pi (ρ2) , . . . ,pi (ρL)〉, strictly positive and
summing to one, so that the jth moment of F appears as
mj=
L
∑
`=1
pi (ρ`) ρ
j
`. (51)
Since the first n moments are known, Equation 51 provides a system of n equalities in 2L un-
knowns (namely, the values ρ` and the associated probabilities pi(ρ`)). This system can be
solved for n sufficiently large, but it is not obvious that the solution will be unique.
Assume now that the grid of admissible values of ρ is 〈0, 1/N, 2/N, . . . , 1〉, with the fineness
parameter N large relative to L.11 In this case F is a discrete distribution fully defined by
the probability masses 〈pi (`/N)〉N`=0, of which exactly L  N are nonzero. Recovering the
distribution then amounts to finding a solution of the system
1
m1
...
mj
...
mn

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
=

1 1 · · · 1 · · · 1
0 1/N · · · `/N · · · 1
...
...
...
...
0 [1/N]j · · · [`/N]j · · · 1
...
...
...
...
0 [1/N]n · · · [`/N]n · · · 1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
V

pi (0)
pi (1/N)
...
pi (`/N)
...
pi (1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
, (52)
11We use an evenly spaced grid of admissible values for notational simplicity, but this is not essential for our
conclusions.
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 with all components of the solution vectorpi weakly positive and exactly L components strictly
positive. Here V is a Vandermonde matrix with many more columns (grid points) than rows
(known moments), implying an underdetermined system.12 But the number L of grid points
actually used could in principle be larger or smaller than n.
A result of Cohen and Yeredor [9, Theorem 1] applies to precisely this situation, stating that
Equation 52 has a unique solution whenever n ≥ 2L. We thus conclude the following.
Proposition 3. In the ρ-model, if F is a discrete distribution over admissible types, with n ≥ 2L, then
it is uniquely determined by the aggregate choice shares 〈p (k)〉nk=1.
That is to say, for practical purposes any discrete distribution for ρ can be fully recovered from
aggregate choice data provided the number of alternatives is large compared to the number of
cognitive types.
3.3.3 Differentiable distributions
Now assume that the type distribution F possesses a probability density f . In this case we
will not be able to fully recover the distribution from the first n moments. Instead, we wish to
ensure that the known moments yield a reliable approximation of the true distribution.
Our analysis relies on standard techniques from the “Hausdorff moment problem” for dis-
tributions on a closed interval. Adopting a maximum entropy approach, define the nth ap-
proximating density fn as the solution to the optimization problem
max
fn
∫ 1
0
[− log fn (ρ)] fn (ρ)dρ (53)
subject to the moment constraints
∀j : 0 ≤ j ≤ n,
∫ 1
0
ρj fn (ρ)dρ = mj. (54)
Mead and Papanicolaou [31, Theorem 2] establish that a solution to this problem exists and is
unique.13 Moreover, for each continuous map ψ : [0, 1]→ < we have
lim
n→∞
∫ 1
0
ψ (ρ) fn (ρ)dρ =
∫ 1
0
ψ (ρ) f (ρ)dρ. (55)
Write Fn for the distribution function associated with the approximating density fn.
12See, e.g., Macon and Spitzbart [23] for the definition and properties of Vandermonde matrices.
13Indeed, the solution takes the form fn (ρ) = exp[−∑nj=0 λjρj], where the quantities 〈λj〉nj=0 are the Lagrange
multipliers on the constraints in Equation 54.
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 Observe now that for any menu A and each k ≤ min {n, |A|}, we have
p (kA; Fn) = p (kM; Fn) = p (kM; F) = p (kA; F) . (56)
Here the first and third equalities follow from the fact that in the ρ-model an alternative’s
choice share depends only on its ordinal position on the menu according to the unanimous
preferences. Moreover, the shares of the n most preferred alternatives are determined by the
first n moments (see Equation 47), which coincide for F and Fn (see Equation 54). This yields
the second equality above, and we can summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 4. In the ρ-model, if F is differentiable then there exists a sequence 〈Fn〉∞n=1 of distributions
such that: (i) each Fn is defined by 〈mj〉nj=1; (ii) Fn converges weakly to F; and (iii) for each menu A and
k ≤ min {n, |A|} we have p (kA; Fn) = p (kA; F).
Equation 54 ensures that each approximation Fn is observationally indistinguishable from
the true F in the sense that the two distributions generate the same first n moments, and hence
the same aggregate choice shares over the observed menu M. Proposition 4 reinforces this
conclusion by guaranteeing that the cognitive heterogeneity in the population is accurately
reflected in two additional ways: First, as the size of the observed menu increases, the resulting
approximations approach the true distribution in the sense of weak convergence. And second,
for any menu size n the approximation Fn matches the true F not just over M, but also over
the n most preferred alternatives on any other menu A about which we may wish to make
predictions.
3.4 Extensions
3.4.1 Indifference
In both of our models of cognitive heterogeneity, strict preferences between the alternatives are
needed for the full identification results. Nevertheless, when indifference is allowed we still
obtain partial restrictions on the type probabilities in the γ-model and the moments of the type
distribution in the ρ-model.
To examine this case, number the alternatives consistently with the ranking (i.e., so that
strict preference implies a lower index) and arbitrarily within each indifference class. For each
index k, write ωk ≤ k for the smallest index such that k and ωk are in the same indifference
class, and ωk ≥ k for the largest such index. We assume that indifferent options are chosen
with equal probability if they are jointly optimal among the subset of alternatives considered.
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 To allow for indifference in the γ-model, we generalize Equations 15–16 to
p(k) =

1
ωk−ωk+1
[
1−∑n−ωkγ=0
(n−ω
k
γ )
(nγ)
pi(γ)
]
if ωk = 1,
1
ωk−ωk+1
[
[∑n−ωk+1γ=1
(n−ωk+1γ )
(nγ)
pi(γ)]− [∑n−ωkγ=1
(n−ω
k
γ )
(nγ)
pi(γ)]
]
if ωk > 1.
(57)
Here the denominator of the first factor is the size of the indifference class containing alternative
k, and in each case the second factor is the probability that the best perceived option is in this
class.
Example 7. [Indifference in the γ-model] Let n = 4 and suppose that the unanimous preferences
over the alternatives are 1  2 ∼ 3  4. Using Equation 57, the analog of Equation 42 is then
p (1)
p(2)
p (3)
p (4)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
=

1
4
1
2
3
4 1
1
4
1
4
1
8 0
1
4
1
4
1
8 0
1
4 0 0 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C

pi (1)
pi(2)
pi (3)
1− F (3)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi
. (58)
Here the matrix C is no longer upper anti-triangular and no longer invertible, since its second
and third rows are identical. Observe that these are the rows that determine the choice shares
of the indifferent alternatives 2 and 3, and any two indifferent options will lead to similar non-
invertibility of C.
From Equation 58 we have pi(1) = 4p(4) and hence 2pi(2) + pi(3) = 8[p(2) − p(4)]. But
we cannot separate pi(2) and pi(3) in this system, since the strict preference 2  3 is needed to
disambiguate the cases γ = 2 and γ = 3. 
To allow for indifference in the ρ-model, we generalize Equations 6 and 45 to
p (k) =
1
ωk −ωk + 1
∫ 1
0
[
[1− ρ]ωk−1 − [1− ρ]ω
k
]
dF
=
1
ωk −ωk + 1
[
[
ωk−1
∑
j=1
[−1]j
[
(ωk−1j )− (ω
k
j )
]
mj]− [
ωk
∑
j=ωk
[−1]j(ωkj )mj]
]
. (59)
Here once again the denominator of the first factor is the size of the indifference class containing
alternative k, while the second factor is the probability that the best perceived option is in this
class.
Example 8. [Indifference in the ρ-model] As in Example 7, let n = 4 and 1  2 ∼ 3  4. Using
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 Equation 59, the analog of Equation 47 is then
p (1)
p(2)
p (3)
p (4)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
=

1 0 0 0
1 − 32 12 0
1 − 32 12 0
1 −3 3 −1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
R

m1
m2
m3
m4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
. (60)
Here the matrix R is no longer lower triangular and no longer invertible, since the rows deter-
mining the choice shares of alternatives 2 and 3 are again identical.
From Equation 60 we have m1 = p(1) and hence 3m2 −m3 = 2[p(1)− p(2)], but we cannot
separate m2 and m3 due to the indifference 2 ∼ 3. 
3.4.2 Taste heterogeneity
Our analysis can be extended to allow for taste heterogeneity, provided it is statistically in-
dependent of the cognitive heterogeneity. To demonstrate this, order the alternatives on the
menu M = {1, 2, . . . , n} arbitrarily and write ϕ : M → {1, 2, . . . , n} for the mapping that as-
sociates each option with its preference rank. We enumerate the possible rankings as 〈ϕh〉n!h=1,
and write τh for the probability of ranking ϕh. In the γ-model, we can express the choice share
of alternative k in the presence of taste heterogeneity as
p(k) =
n!
∑
h=1
τh[Cpi](ϕh(k)) =
n!
∑
h=1
τh[ϕh(C)pi](k), (61)
where ϕh(C) is the matrix constructed by permuting the rows of C according to the ranking ϕh.
The full vector of choice shares is then
p =
n!
∑
h=1
τhϕh(C)pi =
[
n!
∑
h=1
τhϕh(C)
]
pi, (62)
generalizing Equation 42. Thus, provided the taste distribution creates a nonsingular matrix
∑n!h=1 τhϕh(C), we can still use the choice shares to compute the probabilities of the n smallest
consideration capacities as in Section 3.2.2. Similarly, in the ρ-model we obtain the shares
p =
[
n!
∑
h=1
τhϕh(R)
]
m, (63)
generalizing Equation 47 and permitting recovery of the n smallest moments as in Section 3.2.3.
In summary, we conclude that Propositions 1–2 continue to hold under taste heterogeneity
provided the distribution of tastes is known (or can be estimated), and provided this distribu-
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 tion does not make the relevant transition matrix singular.14
Example 9. [Exploded logit] Let n = 3, define u : M → < by u(k) = log k, and suppose that
the distribution of tastes is determined by an exploded logit based on u (see, e.g., Luce and
Suppes [22]). For instance, the probability assigned to the ranking ϕ2 given by 2  3  1 is
computed as
τ2 =
exp[u(2)]
exp[u(1)] + exp[u(2)] + exp[u(3)]
× exp[u(3)]
exp[u(1)] + exp[u(3)]
× exp[u(1)]
exp[u(1)]
=
2
1+ 2+ 3
× 3
1+ 3
× 1
1
=
1
3
× 3
4
× 1 = 1
4
. (64)
In the context of the γ-model we then have
n!
∑
h=1
τhϕh(C) =
1
3

1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3 0
1
3
2
3 1
+ 14

1
3 0 0
1
3
2
3 1
1
3
1
3 0
+ 16

1
3
1
3 0
1
3 0 0
1
3
2
3 1
 · · ·
· · ·+ 1
10

1
3
2
3 1
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3 0
+ 112

1
3
1
3 0
1
3
2
3 1
1
3 0 0
+ 115

1
3
2
3 1
1
3
1
3 0
1
3 0 0
 =

1
3
7
36
1
6
1
3
16
45
1
3
1
3
9
20
1
2
 , (65)
a nonsingular matrix (with determinant 1/270). 
4 Empirical exercise: Demand for OTC painkillers
4.1 Data
In this section we put our two models of cognitive heterogeneity to use by estimating them with
data on sales of over-the-counter (OTC) painkillers. Rather than to carry out a comprehensive
study of limited consideration in the retail market for analgesic drugs—a task that is beyond
the scope of this paper—our aim is to provide a minimal “worked example” demonstrating
that the models are conducive to estimation with a standard dataset.15
Our dataset contains sales data from 77 stores in the Chicago area for a period of 48 weeks.
Painkillers are sold in various quantities under a generic brand as well as three popular brands:
Tylenol, Advil, and Aspirin. For the estimation we include only the eight products that have a
14Taste parameters such as risk aversion coefficients or discount factors can be elicited from subjects separately,
in a setting (e.g., a field or laboratory experiment) where limited attention is not thought to be relevant, and the
resulting values used in the estimation of cognitive heterogeneity. Alternatively, as demonstrated in the empirical
exercise in Section 4, taste and attention parameters can be estimated together via maximum likelihood.
15Indeed, the dataset employed (graciously supplied by Vishal Singh) is typical of those used for estimation using
the techniques of Berry et al. [4].
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 market share of at least three percent. These are the generic brand in sizes 50 and 100 (tablets
per bottle); Tylenol in sizes 25, 50, and 100; Advil in sizes 25 and 50; and Aspirin in size 100.
We observe a total of 3504 store/week combinations, which we refer to as markets. For
each product and market we have data on sales (denoted by Sales), price (Price), and any ap-
plicable promotion (Promo). The dataset also contains demographic information about each
store’s neighborhood: the percentage non-white population (NWP), average education (Edu),
and average household income (Inc). For ease of interpretation, the demographic variables are
standardized across the 3504 markets.
4.2 Model specification
Our model of demand allows for both cognitive and taste heterogeneity. We assume that the
utility of individual i for product k in market s is given by
uiks = [α0 + α1 log Incs + α2NWPs + α3Edus]Priceks · · ·
· · ·+ [β0 + β1 log Incs + β2NWPs + β3Edus]Promoks + δk + eiks, (66)
where δk is a product constant and the error term eiks is extreme value distributed.16 We collect
the utility parameters in ωu =
〈〈
αj, β j
〉3
j=0 , 〈δk〉8k=1
〉
, the market-s variables in
Ds =
〈
〈Salesks, Priceks, Promoks〉8k=1 , Incs, NWPs, Edus
〉
, (67)
and the full dataset in D = 〈Ds〉3504s=1 . The constant for Tylenol 25 is normalized to zero.
To estimate the ρ-model we use the Kumaraswamy distribution (see Example 6), which has
jth raw moment mj = bB(1+ j/a, b).17 For the γ-model we use the Conway-Maxwell-Poisson
(CMP) distribution, a two-parameter extension of the Poisson distribution with probability
mass function
pi(γ) =
λγ
[γ!]ν
[
∞
∑
t=0
λt
[t!]ν
]−1
, (68)
Poisson parameter λ > 0, and dispersion parameter ν ≥ 0.18
The choice probabilities of the eight products included are computed from Equations 62–63.
16In this formulation individual taste heterogeneity in each market is captured by the error term, taste hetero-
geneity across markets is captured by market-level demographics, and unobserved product quality is captured
by the product constant. A more flexible specification would include random coefficients, individual-level demo-
graphics, and an error term incorporating unobserved product quality (see, e.g., Berry et al. [4]). Adding cognitive
heterogeneity to such a model poses significant computational challenges and is beyond the scope of this exercise.
17See Footnote 10 for the definition of the beta function B, and Mitnik [32] for discussion of the relative merits of
the Kumaraswamy and beta distributions.
18See Sellers and Shmueli [38] for the main theoretical properties of the CMP distribution, and Sellers et al. [37]
for applications. Setting ν = 1 yields the Poisson distribution, ν < 1 generates over-dispersion, and ν > 1 generates
under-dispersion. Note that the latter is not accommodated by the better known negative binomial distribution.
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 Since we have no data on potential customers who did not make a purchase, we condition the
theoretical choice probabilities on the event that at least one option is considered.
4.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
We estimate the ρ-model, the γ-model, and a baseline logit model with the utility in Equa-
tion 66. Note that the baseline logit is a limiting case of each of the first two models, in which
all options are considered with certainty. The conditional log-likelihood function is
L(ω; D) =
8
∑
k=1
3504
∑
s=1
Salesks log ps(k;ω, Ds), (69)
where ω is the parameter vector and ps(k;ω, Ds) is the theoretical choice share of product k
in market s. In the (Kumaraswamy) ρ-model we have cognitive parameters ωρ = 〈a, b〉, full
parameter vector ω =
〈
ωu,ωρ
〉
, and theoretical choice shares
ps(k;ω, Ds) =
8!
∑
h=1
τh(ωu, Ds)[ϕh(R)m(ωρ)](k). (70)
Similarly, in the (CMP) γ-model we have cognitive parameters ωγ = 〈λ, ν〉, full parameter
vector ω = 〈ωu,ωγ〉, and choice shares
ps(k;ω, Ds) =
8!
∑
h=1
τh(ωu, Ds)[ϕh(C)pi(ωγ)](k). (71)
4.4 Results
Maximum likelihood estimates for the ρ-model, the γ-model, and the baseline logit model are
reported in Table 1. Observe that the coefficients on the fifteen taste-related variables are similar
across the first two models, with a ratio of 0.8–1.2 in all but one case (Advil 50). Moreover, the
corresponding coefficients in the baseline model are roughly proportional to those in the γ-
model, with a ratio of 0.4–0.6 in all but two cases (Price ·NWP and Advil 50).
The distribution of consideration set size for each model of cognitive heterogeneity is shown
in Table 2 and Figure 1 (assuming average demographics).19
In the ρ-model, the parameter estimates imply an average ρ of 0.322 and a mean size of 2.70,
while in the γ-model the estimates imply a mean size of 2.22. Both assign negligible probability
to consideration sets of size more than six, but the ρ-model shows more dispersion. Indeed, the
γ-model predicts that no individuals will consider more than three options, while the ρ-model
19For the γ-model, the size distribution can be computed from Equation 68 (conditioning on γ ≥ 1). For the
ρ-model, the probability of size j is
∫ 1
0 (
8
j)ρ
j[1− ρ]8−j[1− [1− ρ]8]−1abρa−1[1− ρa]b−1dρ.
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 ρ-model γ-model baseline logit
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Price -0.7885 0.0078 -0.7118 0.0190 -0.4060 0.0062
Price · log Inc 0.0295 0.0032 0.0299 0.0034 0.0150 0.0016
Price ·NWP -0.0120 0.0025 -0.0101 0.0026 -0.0075 0.0013
Price · Edu 0.0229 0.0022 0.0264 0.0027 0.0114 0.0012
Promo 0.4110 0.0161 0.4748 0.0228 0.2114 0.0076
Promo · log Inc 0.0546 0.0279 0.0632 0.0252 0.0298 0.0137
Promo ·NWP -0.1123 0.0212 -0.0974 0.0205 -0.0531 0.0110
Promo · Edu -0.1271 0.0202 -0.1442 0.0193 -0.0651 0.0099
Tylenol 50 1.6151 0.0192 1.6183 0.0622 0.8161 0.0111
Tylenol 100 2.3757 0.0331 2.0950 0.0584 1.2098 0.0231
Advil 25 -0.7765 0.0116 -0.7814 0.0292 -0.3977 0.0070
Advil 50 0.2007 0.0269 0.0663 0.0236 0.0665 0.0130
Aspirin 100 -0.7419 0.0203 -0.7809 0.0308 -0.4213 0.0085
generic 50 -1.9914 0.0159 -1.8922 0.0549 -1.0433 0.0114
generic 100 -0.4817 0.0218 -0.5448 0.0274 -0.2951 0.0097
log a or logλ 2.7931 0.0113 25.0728 4.0323 — —
log b or log ν 17.9750 0.1417 3.1774 0.1656 — —
log-likelihood -654,662.88 -654,548.33 -654,839.74
Table 1: Maximum likelihood estimates.
size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
ρ-model 0.180 0.294 0.278 0.166 0.064 0.016 0.002 0.000
γ-model 0.000 0.782 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 2: Distribution of consideration set size for average demographics.
Figure 1: Distribution of consideration set size for average demographics.
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 model BIC value
ρ-model 1.3095× 106
γ-model 1.3093× 106
baseline logit 1.3099× 106
Table 3: Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values.
predicts that about one-quarter of the population will consider between four and six.20 Neither
model offers any support for the hypothesis that all alternatives are considered.
Table 3 reports Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values for each model estimated. This
model selection criterion favors the γ-model, and ranks the baseline logit below both models
of cognitive heterogeneity. In summary, the empirical exercise provides substantial support for
limited attention on the part of OTC painkiller purchasers, and the models that allow for this
phenomenon agree that the typical consideration set size in the market studied is two or three.
4.5 Related empirical literature
Our empirical exercise contributes to a growing literature on the estimation of consideration
sets from demand data. Sovinsky Goeree [40] investigates the impact of marketing on the
consideration set, using advertising data to separate utility and attentional components of de-
mand. Van Nierop et al. [34] propose a model of brand choice that accommodates both stated
and revealed consideration set data, and apply this framework to an online experiment sim-
ulating a variety of merchandising strategies. Abaluck and Adams [1] build a very general
econometric framework that exploits asymmetries in the matrix of cross-partial derivatives to
identify consideration-set effects. Crawford et al. [10] devise a model-free identification strat-
egy based on reducing the menu of alternatives to a “sufficient set” of those that are certain
to be considered. Lu [20] describes an approach to estimating multinomial choice models that
employs known upper and lower bounds on the consideration set. Honka et al. [16], among
others, model consideration sets as the outcome of a search process, while Gaynor et al. [14]
exploit institutional changes to identify consideration sets in hospital choice.21
Our exercise is distinct from the above literature in that we use a different identification
strategy: We rely on our theoretical results to establish a linear correspondence between the
observed choice shares and the unobserved cognitive parameter (namely, the consideration
20Note that we have not used any demographic or other covariates in the estimation of ρ and γ. Doing so would
allow these cognitive characteristics of the decision maker to be influenced by the environment. For instance, higher
incomes could impose higher opportunity costs of attention and thus lead to smaller consideration sets. Studying
how the cognitive parameters in our models are determined—both theoretically and empirically—is a promising
avenue for future work.
21The search literature typically deals with datasets that include information about the composition of a con-
sumer’s consideration set, though there are exceptions. For example, in Hastings et al. [15] exposure to a sales force
influences the probability that financial products are considered.
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 probability ρ or capacity γ). This enables us to retrieve the type distribution from demand data
via either raw moments (in the ρ-model) or probability masses (in the γ-model).
4.6 Policy analysis
In this section we demonstrate how our empirical results can be used for policy analysis, by
using the “deep parameter” estimates for our models to compute consumer welfare under both
status-quo and counterfactual scenarios. For instance, we can examine the change in welfare
induced by a shift in the distribution of the relevant attention parameter brought about by an
advertising campaign (for painkillers generally), by news coverage, or by interventions in the
market intended to reduce consumers’ search costs.22
Generally speaking, any intervention that increases consumers’ awareness of the products
will shift the distribution of the attention parameter to the right, and for any specified counter-
factual distribution the welfare impact can be easily computed. For simplicity we consider only
the full-attention counterfactual in which each consumer considers all options on the menu,
corresponding to ρ = 1 or γ ≥ n with certainty.
Consider an individual i with utility uiks = viks + eiks for product k in market s. McFad-
den [29] shows that for extreme-value errors the consumer surplus from a subset A of products
is given by
1
αs
log
[
∑
k∈A
exp viks
]
+ constant, (72)
where αs is the marginal utility of income in market s and the constant term reflects the lack of
identification of the absolute level of utility. Writing Aj for the collection of subsets containing
exactly j products, the expected consumer surplus in the ρ-model is then
n
∑
j=1
[∫ 1
0
(nj)ρ
j[1− ρ]n−j
1− [1− ρ]n dF
]
× 1
(nj)
∑
A∈Aj
1
αs
log
[
∑
k∈A
exp viks
]
+ constant. (73)
Similarly, defining the conditional probability masses
pi+(γ) =
1
1− F(0) ×
F(γ)− F(γ− 1) if 1 ≤ γ < n,1− F(n− 1) if γ = n; (74)
22For an example of news coverage plausibly having this effect, see Mele, Christopher, “Picking the Right Over-
the-Counter Pain Reliever,” New York Times, February 6, 2017.
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 the expected consumer surplus in the γ-model is
n
∑
γ=1
pi+ (γ)× 1
(nγ)
∑
A∈Aγ
1
αs
log
[
∑
k∈A
exp viks
]
+ constant. (75)
We use Equation 66 to estimate viks and the price coefficient in each market to estimate
the associated αs. Combining these values with the share of consumers in each market and
the estimated cognitive distribution F, we can then calculate consumer surplus for the limited
attention case in each of our two models. As noted, our counterfactual scenario is that of full
attention, with consumer surplus given by Equation 72 for A equal to the entire menu. This
comparison yields an estimated (expected, per individual) welfare loss from limited attention
of $1.65 in the ρ-model and $1.98 in the γ-model; sizable effects in view of the average price of
$4.27 in our dataset.
5 Concluding comments
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on boundedly rational decision making by
outlining a methodology for inferring the distribution of cognitive characteristics in a popula-
tion using aggregate choice data. A major advantage of our approach is that it assumes a fixed
menu of alternatives, in contrast to much earlier work in this area that assumes knowledge
of a single individual’s choices from a family of overlapping menus. While both theoretical
frameworks yield results that can be brought to bear on data, our view is that the fixed-menu
approach is closer to the practice of empirical research on discrete choice and hence lends itself
particularly well to testing. We have sought to demonstrate this by means of a circumscribed
empirical exercise applying models of consideration set formation to retail choice data.
A second message of the paper is that both the “consideration probability” ρ-model and the
“consideration capacity” γ-model are surprisingly tractable within the fixed-menu framework.
In both models the aggregate choice shares are linear functions of quantities that are highly
informative about the cognitive distribution; namely, low-cardinality choice set probabilities in
the γ-model and low-order raw moments in the ρ-model. These systems are recursive (pro-
vided all preferences are strict) and easily solved for the quantities in question. Indeed, our
theoretical results show that for large menus the cognitive distribution is essentially fully iden-
tified, while for smaller menus we can still infer substantial useful information (and typically
the full distribution in parameterized settings).
Finally, we mention three possible ways to build on the work reported in this paper. One
is to generalize the models of consideration set formation that we have studied; for exam-
ple, by allowing non-uniform consideration probabilities in the ρ-model, or by relaxing the
assumption that all consideration sets with the same cardinality are equally likely to occur in
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 the γ-model.23 Another is to bring additional models of bounded rationality—incorporating
phenomena such as computational constraints and reference points—into the present frame-
work. And a third is to enrich the econometric specification used in our empirical exercise
(see Footnote 16), allowing more precise control of the interaction between cognitive and taste
heterogeneity.
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